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In Focus: Extremism in the US Military

The Alt-Right Movement and US National Security
Matthew Valasik and Shannon E. Reid
©2021 Matthew Valasik and Shannon E. Reid

ABSTRACT: Identifying the January 6 insurrection at the US Capitol as an
inf lection point, this article analyzes the historical relationship between White
supremacy and the US military from Reconstruction after the Civil War to the
present. The article posits causes for the disproportionate number of current and
former members of the military associated with White power groups and proposes
steps the Department of Defense can take to combat the problems posed by the
association of the US military with these groups.

C

Introduction

urrently, there is an overrepresentation of military veterans affiliated with
far-right groups and the broader White power movement, but the disturbing
relationship between White supremacy and the American military dates to before
the American Civil War.1 Most recently, this affinity was underscored by the
disproportionate number of servicemembers, who participated in the failed attempt
to prevent the certification of the 2020 election on January 6, 2021. This incident
renewed concerns about the association between the US military and the White
power movement.2
As of July 16, 2021, 563 individuals have been arrested and charged in
federal court in the aftermath of the insurrection at the US Capitol. At least 82
(14.6 percent) of those arrested are individuals with military backgrounds
predominately affiliated with the Army and the Marine Corps—more than double
the percentage of servicemembers in the US population (approximately 6.1 percent).3
While the motivations driving those individuals vary, almost two-thirds of those
arrested are affiliated with either Proud Boys, an alt-right gang, or Oath Keepers, a
far-right militia. Like many alt-right groups with a White power orientation, these
two groups are loosely structured, lack a rigid ideological focus, and are united
by things they oppose (for example, immigration, feminism, gun restrictions, and so

1. Carter F. Smith, Gangs and the Military: Gangsters, Bikers, and Terrorists with Military Training (Lanham, MD:
Rowman & Littlefield, 2017); and Kathleen Belew, Bring the War Home: The White Power Movement and Paramilitary
America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018).
2. Daniel Milton and Andrew Mines, “This Is War’’: Examining Military Experience among the Capitol Hill Siege
Participants (Washington, DC: George Washington University, 2021).
3. Michael Jensen, Elizabeth Yates, and Sheehan Kane, “Extremism in the Ranks and After” (research brief,
University of Maryland, College Park, MD: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to
Terrorism, 2021), 5; and Milton and Mines, Examining Military Experience, 18–20.
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forth) rather than any central tenet, and are best described as racist.4 Based on
US Code, Title 18, Section 2331, Item (5), both groups would be classified as
organizations engaging in domestic terrorism.5 The FBI and the Department of
Homeland Security commonly refer to these groups as domestic violent extremist
(DVE) organizations.6
This overrepresentation of veterans, however, is supply driven and reflects
veterans’ greater willingness to join far-right groups than the average civilian. It
appears servicemembers are more susceptible to the propaganda and diatribes of
far-right groups, and this relationship needs to be addressed. This article examines
the disconcerting connection between the US military and the White power
movement, traces the historic relationship from past conflicts through the War
on Terror, and provides direction on steps the US military can take to combat
this dilemma.

Historic Relationship with the Military
White anxiety about the inclusion of former slaves into the social order,
including economic competition with White middle and working classes produced
not only the Ku Klux Klan (KKK), which was founded by six Confederate war
veterans, but the Knights of White Camellia, the White League, and other
assorted White power DVEs.7 It was not until the Reconstruction Acts of 1867 and
1868, forcing former Confederate states to rewrite their constitutions, granting
voting rights to Black citizens, and installing the US Army as peacekeepers,
that White power groups proliferated, offering an outlet for Whites to terrorize
Black citizens.8 Arguably, the aftermath of the Civil War and the subsequent
Reconstruction era could be viewed as an outlier exaggerating the affinity
between the White power movement and military veterans.
Yet, surges in membership among veterans enlisting in White power
DVE organizations correlate all too well with the ending of wars and
4. Mike Giglio, “A Pro-Trump Militant Group Has Recruited Thousands of Police, Soldiers, and Veterans,”
Atlantic, November 2020, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/11/right-wing-militias-civil
-war/616473/; George Hawley, Making Sense of the Alt-Right (New York: Columbia University Press,
2017); Sam Jackson, Oath Keepers: Patriotism and the Edge of Violence in a Right-Wing Antigovernment Group
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2020); Matthew Kriner and Jon Lewis, “Pride & Prejudice: The
Violent Evolution of the Proud Boys,” CTC Sentinel 14, no. 6 (2021): 26–38; and Shannon E. Reid and
Matthew Valasik, Alt-Right Gangs: A Hazy Shade of White (Oakland: University of California Press, 2020).
5. Smith, Gangs and the Military, 25–27; and “Definitions,” US Code, Title 18 – Crimes and Criminal Procedure,
Section 2331, Item (5).
6. FBI, “What We Investigate,” https://www.f bi.gov/investigate/terrorism.
7. Edward Ball, Life of a Klansman: A Family History in White Supremacy (New York: Farrar, Straus, and
Giroux, 2020); David J. Chalmers, Hooded Americanism: The History of the Ku Klux Klan (Durham, NC: Duke
University Press, 1987); Elaine Frantz Parsons, Ku-Klux: The Birth of the Klan during Reconstruction (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015); and Rory McVeigh and Kevin Estep, The Politics of Losing:
Trump, the Klan, and the Mainstreaming of Resentment (New York: Columbia University Press, 2019).
8. McVeigh and Estep, Politics of Losing, 22–24.
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conflicts involving the US military, creating a pattern following World
War I, World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Gulf War, and
the War on Terror.9 In particular, America’s defeat in the Vietnam War
produced “loss, frustration, and doubt” among servicemembers, similar to
the feelings experienced by Confederate veterans.10 Whereas state power
reinforced a White supremacist social order and enabled DVE violence during
Reconstruction, the fallout from the Vietnam War was quite different.11
First, after the Vietnam War ended, the fear of communism spreading
across the globe remained a foreign policy concern that provided veterans with
an outlet to channel their discontentment by participating in counterinsurgency
operations as “soldiers of fortune.”12 Such operations were supported by both
neoconservatives and the White power movement, creating a complex web of
interconnections.13
Second, the Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and 1960s drew attention to the
legacy of White supremacy in policing and state power and created an environment
in which vigilante violence was no longer publicly supported by the state.14 This
disavowal marked a turning point in how the White power movement viewed its
relationship to the government. The narrative introduced was a corrupt,
bureaucratic, and ineffective federal government that had hamstrung Vietnam
veterans from becoming triumphant warriors—by restraining their use of force
against the enemy—which the White power movement used to sow distrust of
the government in the minds of veterans.15
The overrepresentation of Vietnam veterans in the White power movement
played an instrumental role in transforming the structure, operation, and
direction of White power DVE organizations. For instance, noteworthy Vietnam
veteran Louis Beam made a major impact on the White power movement. As
a former Klansman and prominent neo-Nazi, Beam urged the White power

9. Belew, Bring the War Home, 20–21; James William Gibson, Warrior Dreams: Violence and Manhood in
Post-Vietnam America (New York: Hill and Wang, 1994), 212–30; and Matt Kennard, Irregular Army: How
the US Military Recruited Neo-Nazis, Gang Members, and Criminals to Fight the War on Terror, (New York:
Verso, 2012), 47–49.
10. Belew, Bring the War Home, 21.
11. Kathleen Belew, “Lynching and Power in the United States: Southern, Western, and National Vigilante
Violence,” History Compass 12, no. 1 (2014): 84–99; and Kathleen Blee and Mehr Latif, “Ku Klux Klan:
Vigilantism against Blacks, Immigrants and Other Minorities,” in Vigilantism against Migrants and Minorities,
ed. Tore Bjørgo and Miroslav Mareš (London: Routledge, 2019), 31–42.
12. Belew, Bring the War Home, 77–100; and Gibson, Warrior Dreams, 195–230.
13. Belew, Bring the War Home, 78.
14. David Cunningham, Klansville, USA: The Rise and Fall of the Civil Rights-Era Ku Klux Klan
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2013); Belew, Bring the War Home, 106–7; Blee and Latif,
Ku Klux Klan, 38–39; and Geoff Ward, “Living Histories of White Supremacist Policing: Towards
Transformative Justice,” Du Bois Review: Social Science Research on Race 15, no. 1 (2018): 167–184.
15. Belew, Bring the War Home, 22–23; and Gibson, Warrior Dreams, 7–10.
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movement to utilize the strategy of “leaderless resistance.”16 Beam contended
that large, centralized White power organizations, such as the KKK or Aryan
Nations, should be abandoned in favor of small groups to better avoid detection
and disruption by law enforcement. Guided by this strategy, Beam established
“Aryan Liberty Net” (Liberty.net) in 1984. This clandestine Aryan Nations
online bulletin board (a precursor to websites today) allowed users to access
recruitment materials, pen pals, password-protected personal ads, and lists of
potential targets to sabotage or individuals to assassinate.17 This capability made
Beam and the broader White power movement one of the first adopters of the
Internet to communicate digitally and organize globally.
The asymmetric use of digital technologies, evolving from Liberty.net, has
allowed White power DVE organizations to maintain communication even if
members are not spatially proximate to each other and spread positions and
propaganda with minimal resources. The adoption of leaderless resistance as
a strategy significantly contributed to the proliferation and persistence of the
movement throughout the United States and internationally.18 The Order,
also known as the Silent Brotherhood, is an example of the application of
leaderless resistance by White power DVE organizations. This group, composed
of military veterans, engaged in paramilitary training and used weapons and
tactics from the Vietnam War to participate in an array of serious and violent
crimes (for example, counterfeiting, bank/armored car robberies, and murder) in
the mid-1980s before being apprehended.19
As the Vietnam War drifted from American collective memory, the public’s
distaste for militarism began to dissolve, and the cycle started again following
the Gulf War. In 1990 Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait. The United States
responded, along with a broad coalition of support, and drove out Iraqi forces
and restored Kuwait’s independence in under six weeks. While this quick
and seemingly easy victory ended American’s aversion to foreign military
conflicts, it had an unintended consequence among members of the White
16. Louis Beam, “Leaderless Resistance,” originally written 1983, reprinted in Seditionist 12 (February 1992);
Belew, Bring the War Home, 19; and Jeffrey Kaplan, “Leaderless Resistance,” Terrorism and Political Violence 9,
no. 3 (1997): 80–95.
17. Belew, Bring the War Home, 120–21; Chip Berlet and Carol Mason, “Swastikas in Cyberspace:
How Hate Went Online,” in Digital Media Strategies of the Far Right in Europe and the United States,
ed. Patricia Anne Simpson and Helga Druxes (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2015), 21–30; Travis Morris,
Dark Ideas: How Neo-Nazi and Violent Jihadi Ideologues Shaped Modern Terrorism (Lanham, MD: Lexington
Books, 2017), 56.
18. Beam, “Leaderless Resistance,” 12–13; Belew, Bring the War Home, 108–13; and George Michael, Lone Wolf
Terror and the Rise of Leaderless Resistance (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 2012), 55–56.
19. Belew, Bring the War Home, 115–37; James Coates, Armed and Dangerous: The Rise of the Survivalist
Right (New York: Noonday Press, 1987), 41–76; Kevin Flynn and Gary Gerhardt, The Silent Brotherhood:
The Chilling Inside Story of America’s Violent, Anti-Government Militia Movement (New York: Signet, 1990);
Mark S. Hamm, In Bad Company: America’s Terrorist Underground (Boston: Northeastern University Press,
2002); and Pete Simi, Bryan F. Bubolz, and Ann Hardman, “Military Experience, Identity Discrepancies,
and Far Right Terrorism: An Exploratory Analysis,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 36, no. 8 (2013): 662–64.
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power movement. Instead of the Gulf War being viewed as a heroic triumph
able to offset the defeat and frustration of the Vietnam War, the White power
movement used the resounding success of the military campaign as evidence
that an untrustworthy federal government had betrayed Vietnam veterans and
prevented them from wearing the mantles of triumphant warriors.20
In conjunction with the standoff at Ruby Ridge, Idaho, and the siege at
Waco, Texas, in the early 1990s, the White power movement further fueled
the fabrication of a brutish federal government that was intentionally targeting
civilian groups (for example, far-right) and oppressing them.21 This narrative
circulated and gained support from Gulf War servicemembers and veterans who
were disaffected with the US military, often as a result of personal difficulties.22
By far, the most noteworthy Gulf War Army veteran who subscribed to these
White power talking points is Timothy McVeigh, who perpetrated the deadliest
act of domestic terrorism in the United States on April 19, 1995—the Oklahoma
City bombing that killed 168 people and injured 509.23
Perhaps Beam and McVeigh’s experiences and training in the Army assisted
them in later endeavors among various White power DVE groups and inspired
others. Beam and McVeigh are just two examples of a litany of servicemembers
who have brought the war home with them and continue fighting today. In the
aftermath of the Oklahoma City bombing, the scrutiny of far-right groups,
particularly antigovernment militias, by federal law enforcement agencies
peaked and drove affiliates underground and into the recesses of the Internet.24
The White power movement festers and metastasizes in this digital medium
until a physical environment becomes hospitable for them to reemerge in public.
During the 2000s, the growth of the White power movement remained generally
uninterrupted, due to the focus on jihadi violent extremists and the subsequent
War on Terror following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.25

20. Belew, Bring the War Home, 211; and Gibson, Warrior Dreams, 195–96, 291–97.
21. Belew, Bring the War Home, 187–208; Lane Crothers, Rage on the Right: The American Militia
Movement from Ruby Ridge to the Trump Presidency, 2nd ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2019),
34–58; Betty A. Dobratz, Stephanie L. Shanks‐Meile, and Danelle Hallenbeck, “What Happened on Ruby
Ridge: Terrorism or Tyranny?” Symbolic Interaction 26, no. 2 (2003): 315–42; Mark S. Hamm, Apocalypse
in Oklahoma: Waco and Ruby Ridge Revenged (Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press, 1997); and
Jackson, Oath Keepers, 92–99.
22. Belew, Bring the War Home, 213.
23. Belew, Bring the War Home, 209–34; Crothers, Rage on the Right, 76–87; Hamm, Apocalypse in Oklahoma;
Simi, Bubolz, and Hardman, “Military Experience, Identity Discrepancies,” 661–62; Arie Perliger, American
Zealots: Inside Right-Wing Domestic Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2020), 70–71;
Smith, Gangs and the Military, 51–53; and Stuart A. Wright, Patriots, Politics, and the Oklahoma City Bombing
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
24. Crothers, Rage on the Right, 91–95; and Daryl Johnson, Hateland: A Long, Hard Look at America’s
Extremist Heart (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2019), 57–58.
25. Crothers, Rage on the Right, 109–18; and Smith, Gangs and the Military, 68–73.
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The War on Terror and the White Power Movement
While the swift and resounding victory of the Gulf War seemed to shake
“Vietnam Syndrome,” it appears the ghosts of Vietnam “buried forever in
the sands of the Arabian Peninsula” have become poltergeists, tormenting
American servicemembers once again with America’s never-ending War on
Terror, now approaching its twentieth year.26 The same “loss, frustration, and
doubt” felt by Vietnam and Confederate veterans is being experienced by
today’s servicemembers.27 Even more alarming, post-9/11 veterans are more
likely to have been deployed, served in combat, experienced emotional trauma,
had difficulty transitioning to civilian life, and felt less proud to serve in the
military than pre-9/11 veterans.28 A modern-day all-volunteer US military
might be expected to be less disillusioned than those who were drafted during
the Vietnam War.29
Arguably, the quota requirements for troops needed for the War on Terror
lowered the recruitment standards, increased the use of “moral waivers” to dismiss
criminal convictions, and decreased the use of discharges for misconduct.30
Shifts in these policies resulted in the military enlisting substandard
personnel to meet the quotas, an outcome observed among other federal agencies
(for example, the Department of Homeland Security) that succumb to filling
positions with warm bodies.31
While the mass recruitment of less-than-ideal servicemembers is problematic
on its own, the War on Terror is substantially different from America’s prior
conflict in Western Asia (for example, the Gulf War). Differences include the
structure of warfare, fighting an insurgency, guerilla war tactics, suicide bombers,
and pervasive improvised explosive device use, with infantry and special operators
being the principal military component as opposed to the use of tanks supported
by air and sea campaigns in the Gulf War.32 Additionally, the duration of the
26. George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: US Foreign Relations since 1776 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2008), 912–16; and Arnold R. Isaacs, Vietnam Shadows: The War, its Ghosts, and Its Legacy
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), 65–66.
27. Belew, Bring the War Home, 21; Kennard, Irregular Army, 215–16.
28. Kim Parker et al., The American Veteran Experience and the Post-9/11 Generation (Washington, DC:
Pew Research Center, 2019), 3–5.
29. Lawrence M. Baskir and William A. Strauss, Chance and Circumstance: The Draft, the War, and the
Vietnam Generation (New York; Vintage Books, 1978); and Kennard, Irregular Army, 5–6.
30. Belew, Bring the War Home, 27; Kennard, Irregular Army, 46–47, 74–76; and Smith, Gangs and the
Military, 38–39, 201.
31. Melissa del Bosque, “A Group of Agents Rose through the Ranks to Lead the Border Patrol: They’re
Leaving It in Crisis,” ProPublica, February 10, 2020, https://www.propublica.org/article/a-group-of-agents-rose
-through-the-ranks-to-lead-the-border-patrol-theyre-leaving-it-in-crisis; and Bryan Schatz, “New Report
Details Dozens of Corrupt Border Patrol Agents—Just as Trump Wants to Hire More,” Mother Jones,
April 24, 2018, https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2018/04/new-report-details-dozens-of-corrupt-border
-patrol-agents-just-as-trump-wants-to-hire-more/.
32. Robert M. Cassidy, Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror: Military Culture and Irregular
War (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 103; and Christopher Coker, The Warrior
Ethos: Military Culture and the War on Terror (New York: Routledge, 2007), 24.
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War on Terror is approaching two decades while the Gulf War only lasted 43 days.
Together, these distinctions have contributed to servicemembers experiencing
greater emotional trauma and more challenges transitioning back to civilian
life. In addition, the poor quality of care provided to servicemembers has only
facilitated disillusionment.33
Present-day White power DVE organizations harness and pervert these
feelings to support their narrative and refine their talking points to connect with a
broader, more mainstream audience—a process accelerated by the ubiquity of the
Internet and the increased use of social media platforms.34 They cast a much wider
net to ensnare potential followers by deploying ironic and caustic memes rapidly
across a variety of digital platforms.35 There is a variability in the content that gets
distributed, depending on the level of fanaticism. For instance, many alt-right
gangs, like Proud Boys or Rise Above Movement (an alt-right mixed-martial arts
group), tend to obfuscate their extremism to appeal to more mainstream youth.36
Other more extreme DVE groups do not attempt to mask their adherence
to White supremacy. Atomwaffen Division, The Base, and Boogaloo Bois use
extreme imagery and catchy slogans in their propaganda materials and explicitly
advocate for violence against the government in preparation for an upcoming race/
civil war.37 They require members to participate in paramilitary training, similar
to long-established far-right militias.38 Even though such activities make these
militias illegal in all 50 states, there is no shortage of veterans in their ranks.39
Furthermore, the accelerationist rhetoric used to recruit members—calling for
a second civil war or a racial holy war—is translating into real-world violence.
Members have been arrested for stockpiling firearms and explosives, plotting
terror and infrastructure attacks, kidnapping government officials, and
committing murder.40

33. Kennard, Irregular Army, 200–18; and Parker et al., American Veteran Experience.
34. Ariadna Matamoros-Fernández and Johan Farkas, “Racism, Hate Speech, and Social Media: A Systematic
Review and Critique,” Television & New Media 22, no. 2 (2021): 205–24.
35. Reid and Valasik, Alt-Right Gangs, 47–50, 100–3; and Heather Suzanne Woods and Leslie A. Hahner,
Make America Meme Again: The Rhetoric of the Alt-Right (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2019).
36. Cynthia Miller-Idriss, Hate in the Homeland: The New Global Far Right (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 2020), 99–105; Reid and Valasik, Alt-Right Gangs, 24–29.
37. Reid and Valasik, Alt-Right Gangs, 42–44; and Southern Poverty Law Center, Sounds Like Hate,
produced by Geraldine Moriba and Jamila Paksima, podcast series, https://soundslikehate.org/.
38. Belew, Bring the War Home, 77–134; Gibson, Warrior Dreams, 195–230; and Harel Shapira, Waiting for
José: The Minutemen’s Pursuit of America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013).
39. Crothers, Rage on the Right, 128–37; Jackson, Oath Keepers; and Perliger, American Zealots, 53–59.
40. Reid and Valasik, Alt-Right Gangs, 42–44; Kaleigh Rogers, “Why Militias Are So Hard to Stop,”
FiveThirtyEight, May 18, 2021, https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/militias-pose-a-serious-threat-so-why-is-it
-so-hard-to-stop-them/; and Bradley E. Wiggins, “Boogaloo and Civil War 2: Memetic Antagonism in
Expressions of Covert Activism,” New Media & Society (August 2020), doi:10.1177/1461444820945317.
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Current State of the Problem
The level and extent to which support for White power sentiments has
infiltrated the US military remains unclear. As routine practice, the service
branches deny its persistence. Both the FBI and the Department of Homeland
Security have expressed concern for over a decade about the recruitment of active
servicemembers by White power DVE groups. Yet, there remains limited
knowledge about just how pervasive far-right affiliations are among active-duty
personnel.41 What little is known about the current prevalence of White
power sympathies comes from a 2019 poll of Military Times readers. The poll
revealed 36 percent of troops witnessed “[W]hite supremacist and racist ideologies,”
with enlisted and non-White members being more likely to observe these
behaviors than officers and White members.42 This is a substantial increase from a
2018 poll of Military Times readers when only 22 percent reported the presence of
White power activities. This trend is moving in a concerning direction.43
The military’s response to DVE affiliations has been inconsistent, partially
due to maintaining troop quotas and not raising alarms that would increase
congressional scrutiny.44 When the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq required more
troops, the number of discharges declined and the standards for recruitment were
relaxed, meeting quotas with substandard personnel.45 The combination of reduced
standards and an entrenched “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy regarding the attitudes of
servicemembers toward White supremacism and other extremist beliefs have fused
in a dangerous and volatile manner.46
As details about the January 6 insurrection continue to emerge, it becomes
clear alt-right gangs, antigovernment militias, and conspiracy theorists (for
example, QAnon) played an outsized role.47 The fact that this attempt to usurp
America’s democracy involved not just an overrepresentation of servicemembers,
who solemnly “support and defend the Constitution of the United States
against all enemies, foreign and domestic,” but any at all is disconcerting.48
Recent years have shown a greater portion of the public than expected are
sympathetic to identity politics and White power propaganda of the alt-right—
41. Johnson, Hateland; and Smith, Gangs and the Military, 106–9.
42. Leo Shane III, “Signs of White Supremacy, Extremism Up Again in Poll of Active-Duty Troops,”
Military Times, February 6, 2020, https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2020/02/06
/signs-of-white-supremacy-extremism-up-again-in-poll-of-active-duty-troops/.
43. Shane, “Signs of White Supremacy.”
44. Belew, Bring the War Home, 27; and Kennard, Irregular Army.
45. Kennard, Irregular Army, 46–47; and Smith, Gangs and the Military, 38–39, 201.
46. Kelly R. Buck et al., Screening for Potential Terrorists in the Enlisted Military Accessions Process, Technical
Report 05-8 (Monterey, CA: Department of Defense Personnel Security Research Center, 2005).
47. “American Insurrection,” Frontline, season 39, episode 15, PBS, aired April 13, 2021, https://www.pbs
.org/wgbh/frontline/film/american-insurrection/.
48. “Enlistment Oath,” US Code, Title 10, Section 502, May 5, 1960, https://www.army.mil/values
/oath.html.
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approximately 6 percent of non-Hispanic, White Americans, or about 11 million
citizens.49 The presence of extremists in the ranks should raise concerns among
military leaders about the way military training and practices fail to prevent these
associations and may perpetuate them. Furthermore, servicemembers, active duty
or discharged, present a potentially greater threat than civilians given their
leadership skills, military training, and advanced training in special operations,
explosive ordnance disposal, or cyber-operations.50
Despite well-documented incidents over the years involving servicemembers
engaging in White power-inspired violence and disrupting civilian communities,
ongoing efforts by the military to address the public’s outcry on White power
DVE groups are lackluster. Though lacking the sustained scrutiny of the
January 6 insurrection, the 1995 murders of two Black civilians by active-duty
paratroopers in Fayetteville, North Carolina; the 2012 mass shooting by an Army
veteran at a Sikh Temple in Oak Creek, Wisconsin; and the participation in
violence by at least four Marines, two active-duty and two discharged, at the
2017 “Unite the Right” rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, were inspired by
the White power movement.51 January 6 produced an inflection point about
the growing number of active-duty and discharged servicemembers who are
associated with far-right groups. The US military now has an opportunity to
address the concerns raised for over a decade by the Department of Defense,
the Department of Homeland Security, and the FBI.52

Combating the White Power Movement
As the understanding of the connections between the White power movement
and the military continues to grow, the US military needs to take serious steps
to prevent, intervene, and potentially suppressthe far-right activities of both
active-duty and retired servicemembers. The ubiquity of the Internet and other
digital communication (for example, online forums, image boards, and social media
platforms) has allowed individuals interested in or affiliated with the White power
49. George Hawley, “The Demography of the Alt-Right,” Institute for Family Studies, August 9, 2018,
https://ifstudies.org/blog/the-demography-of-the-alt-right.
50. Belew, Bring the War Home, 52–53; Kennard, Irregular Army, 39; Simi, Bubolz, and Hardman, “Military
Experience, Identity Discrepancies,” 654–71; and Smith, Gangs and the Military, 187–96.
51. Belew, Bring the War Home, 135–55; William Branigin and Dana Priest, “3 White Soldiers Held in
Slaying of Black Couple, Washington Post, December 9, 1995, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/
politics/1995/12/09/3-white-soldiers-held-in-slaying-of-black-couple/1f11ca9f-9fe2-4e28-a637-a635007deeaf/;
Kennard, Irregular Army, 45; Arno Michaelis and Pardeep Singh Kaleka, The Gift of Our Wounds: A
Sikh and a Former White Supremacist Find Forgiveness after Hate (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2018);
Michael A. Peters and Tina Besley, “White Supremacism: The Tragedy of Charlottesville,” Educational
Philosophy and Theory 49, no. 14 (2017): 1309-12; and Paul Szoldra “These Are the Faces of Extremism in
the Military: It Only Takes One to Wreak Havoc in the Ranks,” Task & Purpose, April 23, 2021,
https://taskandpurpose.com/news/us-military-extremism/.
52. Johnson, Hateland, 32–34; and “Gangs in the Military: How Much Do We Know?” Stars and Stripes,
February 8, 2007, https://www.stripes.com/news/gangs-in-the-military-how-much-do-we-know-1.60141.
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movement to connect.53 Despite military personnel being governed by the Uniform
Code of Military Justice and its narrower application of the First
Amendment—limiting the free speech protections of servicemembers
and veterans—it would be a hefty challenge for the US government to
monitor all the digital communications of active-duty servicemembers, let alone
veterans.54 While the ethics and legality of such an undertaking are problematic,
such monitoring is also likely to experience blowback, a succession of false
positives, and further serve the White power movement’s distorted narrative that a
corrupt and disloyal federal government is restricting the freedom of individuals.55
Instead, a starting point would be to consider the shifts in a
servicemember’s life course—from recruitment to basic training to deployment to
reintegration to end of active-duty service. These different transitions may have a multitude
of impacts on an individual’s behavior. For example, research shows that entering military
service can be a turning point that inhibits criminal activity.56 What is less clear is how
the act of leaving military service, particularly if it is involuntary, might impact future
behavior when the institutional social structure and networks are removed.57 As seen in
other research areas, such as traditional street gangs or White power DVEs organizations,
risk factors can shift over time and life circumstances.58 This finding includes a key dynamic.
Once an individual joins either of these groups, their behavior is more delinquent than
individuals who are just surrounded by delinquent peers.59
Intervention and prevention programs should target these turning
points and provide appropriate transition services, including initial social
53. Kennard, Irregular Army, 34–36; and Miller-Idriss, Hate in the Homeland, 138–60.
54. Danley K. Cornyn, “The Military, Freedom of Speech, and the Internet: Preserving Operational
Security and Servicemembers’ Right of Free Speech,” Texas Law Review 87, no. 2 (2008): 463–86;
Walter M. Hudson, “Racial Extremism in the Army,” Military Law Review 159 (March 1999): 1–86;
and “Uniform Code of Military Justice,” US Code, Title 10, Chapter 47.
55. Ken Klippenstein, “Pentagon Plans to Monitor Social Media of Military Personnel for Extremist
Content,” Intercept, May 17, 2021, https://theintercept.com/2021/05/17/military-pentagon-extremism
-social-media/.
56. Leana Allen Bouffard, “Examining the Relationship between Military Service and Criminal Behavior
during the Vietnam Era: A Research Note,” Criminology 41, no. 2 (2003): 491–51; Glen H. Elder Jr.,
“War Mobilization and the Life Course: A Cohort of World War II Veterans,” Sociological Forum 2, no. 3
(Summer 1987): 449–72; John H. Laub and Robert J. Sampson, Shared Beginnings, Divergent Lives:
Delinquent Boys to Age 70 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003); and John Paul Wright,
David E. Carter, and Francis T. Cullen, “A Life-Course Analysis of Military Service in Vietnam,”
Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 42, no. 1 (2005): 55–83.
57. Lauren Van Staden et al., “Transition Back into Civilian Life: A Study of Personnel Leaving the
UK Armed Forces via ‘Military Prison’,” Military Medicine 172, no. 9 (2007): 925–30; and Kevin M.
Wilson-Smith and Philip J. Corr, Military Identity and the Transition into Civilian Life: “Lifers,”
Medically Discharged and Reservist Soldiers (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019).
58. Beidi Dong, Chris L. Gibson, and Marvin D. Krohn, “Gang Membership in a Developmental and
Life-Course Perspective,” in the The Handbook of Gangs, ed. Scott H. Decker and David C. Pyrooz
(Oxford, UK: John Wiley & Sons, 2015): 78–97; and Pete Simi, Karyn Sporer, and Bryan F. Bubolz,
“Narratives of Childhood Adversity and Adolescent Misconduct as Precursors to Violent Extremism: A
Life-Course Criminological Approach,” Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 53, no. 4 (2016): 536–63.
59. Maxime Bérubé et al., “Converging Patterns in Pathways in and out of Violent Extremism,” Perspectives
on Terrorism 13, no. 6 (2019): 73–89; and Chris Melde and Finn‐Aage Esbensen, “Gang Membership as a
Turning Point in the Life Course,” Criminology 49, no. 2 (2011): 513–52.
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media literacy and critical-thinking courses as part of basic training and a
survey and assessment at each turning point in a service career. As an added
benefit, these assessments would also help servicemembers take stock of
other mental health issues while giving military leaders a screening tool for
identifying personnel susceptible to White power DVE groups or even those
working on behalf of the organizations. Following active-duty service, the
US Department of Veterans Affairs could establish moderated in-person and
online social support groups as an alternative forum to challenge the disinformation
propagated by White power DVE organizations. While all veterans would likely
benefit from increased social support, a more-tailored approach focused on veterans
who are assessed as being vulnerable to extremism, far-right or otherwise, could be
required to participate in the prosocial support groups or one-on-one therapy or risk
losing benefits.
Research has also shown that in paramilitary organizations (for example,
police departments) where the chain of command oversees disciplinary action, the
consequences of misconduct are frequently light and often thought to be one-off
incidents without any systemic influence on the unit or department.60 Recent studies
have noted that misconduct by law enforcement officers spreads through a police
department’s social networks.61 This contagion model of misconduct could be applied
to understanding how White power beliefs and behavior spread through institutions,
such as the military.
The assumption that an individual’s behavior is separate from the larger unit has
led to a dearth of research regarding deviance among those in positions of power and
the influence of these individuals on the larger group.62 For example, the arrest of an
active-duty Marine at the January 6 insurrection underscores that the rules in place are
not sufficient to restrain individual behavior.63 Furthermore, that Marine’s larger social
network may have influenced this behavior (including those who may have been present
but not arrested) and should be investigated instead of treating him as a single bad apple.

60. Kimberly D. Hassell and Carol Archbold, “Widening the Scope on Complaints of Police Misconduct,”
Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management 33, no. 3 (2010); and Kim Michelle Lersch
and Tom Mieczkowski, “An Examination of the Convergence and Divergence of Internal and External
Allegations of Misconduct Filed against Police Officers,” Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies &
Management 23, no. 1 (2000).
61. Marie Ouellet et al., “Network Exposure and Excessive Use of Force: Investigating the Social
Transmission of Police Misconduct,” Criminology & Public Policy 18, no. 3 (August 2019): 675–704; and
Linda Zhao and Andrew V. Papachristos, “Network Position and Police Who Shoot,” ANNALS of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science 687, no. 1 (2020): 89–112.
62. Matts Hammarstrom and Birger Heldt, “The Diffusion of Military Intervention: Testing a Network
Position Approach,” International Interactions 28, no. 4 (2002): 355–77; and Peter V. Marsden and Noah E.
Friedkin, “Network Studies of Social Influence,” Sociological Methods & Research 22, no. 1 (1993): 127–51.
63. Corey Dickstein, “Marine Major Charged with Assaulting Officers during Jan. 6 Siege of US Capitol,”
Stars and Stripes, May 13, 2021, https://www.stripes.com/news/us/marine-major-charged-with-assaulting
-officers-during-jan-6-siege-of-us-capitol-1.673373.
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In order to address this issue, the military should ensure support for or activity
with White power DVE groups will be identified as a criminal matter to be handled
by Criminal Investigation Divisions and not treated as a discipline and order issue.64
By reclassifying such activity as criminal rather than disciplinary, the Army could
prevent casual engagement with White power viewpoints that might grow into
serious criminal tendencies after separating from the military. A criminal investigation
would also help the Army to identify larger networks and mediums of influence and
how White power DVE organizations disseminate messages throughout their ranks,
enabling the US military a greater opportunity to educate and protect current and
former servicemembers. In addition to providing support services that would help
nullify the abandonment narrative, the military’s criminalizing support for White
power DVE organizations could help frame these extremists as villains who—like
foreign agents—seek to undermine and corrupt American democracy.65
The final, and perhaps most at-risk transitional phase for servicemembers is when
they exit the military. Disillusionment, trauma, lack of opportunities, and removal
of the rules and safeguards in place can put veterans in a vulnerable situation for
recruitment by White power DVEs and make them much more susceptible to the
pull of these groups, who provide a new enemy to hate and move against.
Again, using the insurrection at the US Capitol as an example, at least 82
individuals with military backgrounds participated in the vitriolic violence and
rioting.66 As we consider this transition, we can regard active-duty military service as a
period of strong labels, control systems, and associations. These labels and associations
are thrown into doubt during the preparation for and separation from the military. To
prevent these issues, the US military can conduct a series of exit interviews to monitor
the mental and social health of veterans and reach out with additional resources as
needed.
Additionally, the military should provide more career counseling and support
groups with former servicemembers to engage veterans in prosocial support groups
that meet synchronously online or in person. As the January 6 insurrection reveals,
without the US military creating and propagating a counternarrative among its
personnel that frames White power DVEs as terrorists and enemies of the state,
these extremist groups will continue to thrive and recruit active-duty, retired, and
separated servicemembers.

64. Kennard, Irregular Army, 44–46; and Smith, Gangs and the Military, 124–31.
65. John E. Finn, Fracturing the Founding: How the Alt-Right Corrupts the Constitution, (Lanham, MD:
Rowman & Littlefield, 2019).
66. Jensen, Yates, and Kane, “Extremism in the Ranks,” 5; Cynthia Miller-Idriss, “D.C. Officer
Daniel Hodges Called Capitol Rioters ‘Terrorists.’ Here’s Why That Matters,” MSNBC, July 28, 2021,
https://www.msnbc.com/opinion/d-c-officer-daniel-hodges-called-capitol-rioters-terrorists-here-n1275231; and
Milton and Mines, Examining Military Experience, 18–20.
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At the end of the day, all servicemembers come home. It is imperative military
leaders proactively address the issues surrounding the adoption of far-right
narratives or association with White power DVE organizations—and not brush
them aside or ignore them. To reduce the allure of far-right extremism, the military
should develop appropriate health-care systems for both active-duty and retired
servicemembers, particularly addressing PTSD, and establish wraparound services
to ease the transition to civilian life, including financial assistance programs for
economic hardships. Instead of protecting the nation from a domestic enemy, the
military’s inaction is contributing to the White power movement’s growth and
capacity for violence, making American communities less safe.
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